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Abstract
Security issues in East-Central Europe have received a high profile recently with the 
proposed entry of three post-Communist countries into NATO and discussion about further 
widening this alliance. The collapse of communism and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact has 
brought new military alignments and potentialities. However, with the transformation of these 
countries into democratic societies, the views of the population also need to be taken into 
account. In this paper we report the results of a longitudinal, representative sample survey of 
ten post-Communist countries in East-Central Europe: Hungary, Poland, Czech and Slovak 
Republics, Ukraine, Belarus, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia and Croatia . The paper compares 
the results of questions about attitudes to internal and external security in 1992 and 1996 in 
each of these countries. In particular, we consider subjective perceptions of threat from 
neighbouring countries, from great powers such as Russia, Germany and the USA, from 
national minorities and ethnic groups and from immigrants and migrants. In this context we 
analyse their views on NATO membership. We compare these countries in general by 
constructing an index of perceptions of threat. The results imply that the countries of the 
former Yugoslavia and the Central European buffer zone feel far more insecurity than the 
countries of the former Soviet Union in our sample, and these are also the countries which 
would most like to join NATO.
Zusammenfassung
Fragen der Sicherheit haben in Mitteleuropa und Osteuropa in jüngster Zeit eine deutliche 
Aufmerksamkeitssteigerung dadurch erfahren, daß drei postkommunistische Länder für die 
Aufnahme in die NATO vorgeschlagen wurden und daß die Diskussion über die Oster­
weiterung der NATO stark an Tempo gewonnen hat. Der Zusammenbruch des Kommunis­
mus einerseits und die Auflösung des Warschauer Paktes andererseits bewirkten neue 
militärische Bündnismöglichkeiten und Kooperationschancen im Sicherheitsbereich. Die 
Transformation dieser Länder in demokratische Gesellschaften brachte es aber auch un­
ausweichlich mit sich, daß die Ansichten und Meinungen der Öffentlichkeit und der Bürger in 
stärkerem Maße Berücksichtigung finden. In diesem Artikel berichten wir über die Haupter­
gebnisse einer repräsentativen und longitudinalen Umfragestudie in zehn postkommunis­
tischen Staaten Mittel- und Osteuropas: Tschechien, Slowakei, Ungarn, Slowenien, Kroatien, 
Polen, Rumänien, Bulgarien, Ukraine und Belarus. Diese Studie vergleicht die Einstellungen 
der Bevölkerungen dieser Region in Hinblick auf die innere und äußere Sicherheit in diesen 
10 Staaten in der Periode zwischen 1992 und 1996. Insbesondere untersuchten wir die sub­
jektiven Wahrnehmungen und Einschätzungen einer Bedrohung seitens der Nachbarstaaten, 
seitens Großmächten wie der Russischen Föderation, Deutschland und der USA, seitens 
nationaler Minderheiten und ethnischer Gruppen sowie ausgehend von Migranten und Immi­
granten. In diesem Zusammenhang analysieren wir die Einstellungen der Bürgerinnen und
Bürger dieser Staaten zur Mitgliedschaft des eigenen Landes zur NATO. Wir vergleichen 
diese Länder auch in einer allgemeinen Weise durch die Verwendung eines BEDROHUNGS­
INDEX, der in einer einzelnen Maßzahl das subjektive Bedrohungsbild einer nationalen 
Bevölkerung erstmals quantifiziert. Die Ergebnisse unserer Studie lassen den Schluß zu, daß 
die Länder des Gebiets des früheren Jugoslawien einerseits und der mitteleuropäischen 
Pufferzone andererseits das höchste Niveau an subjektiven Bedrohungsbildern aufweisen. 
Zugleich sind dies jene Länder, die am stärksten in die NATO als Militärbündnis im Neuen 
Europa drängen.
Keywords
Security, Central Europe, Post-Communism, NATO 
Schlagworte
Sicherheit, Mitteleuropa, Post-Kommunismus, NATO
Acknowledgements:
This paper is based on work carried out during a visit to the European Centre for Analysis in 
the Social Sciences (ECASS) at the University o f Essex supported by The European Com­
mission Training and Mobility o f Researchers - Access to Large Scale Facilities Programme. 
It was first presented at the Advanced Research Workshop on Scientific Information Dis­
semination and Access in Russia and Eastern Europe
Contents
Sources of insecurity 2
a. Neighbouring countries
b. Great powers
c: National minorities and ethnic groups 
d. Escalating migration
Who are friends and who are enemies? 5
1. Perceptions of threat 6
2. Wo is afraid of Russia? 8
3. Wo is afraid of Germany? 10
4. Wo is afraid of America? 12
5. Wo is afraid of neighbouring countries? 13
6. Internal threats: who is afraid of ethnic groups and minorities?
7. Wo is afraid of migrants and refugees? 17
Subjective Insecurity Index 19
Attitudes toward joining NATO 21
What is the patterning of attitudes about security?
Conclusions 25
References 27

I H S — Haerpfer and Wallace / Subjective Insecurity in Post-Communist Eastern Europe — 1
The ending of the Cold War following the extraordinary political events in Eastern Europe at 
the end of the 1980s served to re-shape the political and military map of Europe. In the words 
of George Bush it augured a 'New World Order’. Previously the Iron Curtain had divided 
Europe in to two halves, East and West, Communist and Capitalist, NATO and Warsaw Pact. 
The break up of the Warsaw Pact, the collapse of Communism and the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union into different states dissolved this neat divide set up after the Second World 
War. For the countries of Central Europe, traditionally a military ‘Buffer Zone’ between East 
and West it required some re-thinking of external security issues - who was now an enemy 
and who was a friend? This was a much a question for traditionally militarily neutral Austria 
as for the newly emerging democracies of Poland, Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary, 
Bulgaria and Romania. For those countries who had previously formed part of the Soviet 
Union but were now for the first time fully independent these issues also arose. However, the 
opening of borders and the opening of societies also threw up new internal security issues as 
states began to fissure and re-align, populations began to move once more around the region 
and ethnic minorities found new voices with which to put forward their claims.
Since the initial transformation period things have moved on rapidly. Several elections have 
confirmed the position of democratically elected governments in Poland, Hungary, Czech and 
Slovak Republics and these countries also have special associate membership status of the 
EU and some of them are scheduled to become members after 2000. The privatisation 
policies and successful economic transformation are making these countries increasingly 
'normal' parts of western Europe. However, war in the former Yugoslavia sent those 
countries in a different direction, even diverging from one another, with relatively prosperous 
Slovenia looks more like one of the Visegrad countries mentioned above and is expected to 
join the European Union in the not too distant future. The break up of Czechoslovakia in 1992 
showed that there were also peaceful means of bringing about the fission of post-Communist 
countries. Romania and Bulgaria, have not gone the way of the former Yugoslavia, but also 
aspire to European Union recognition. Furthermore, they have been diverging from one 
another as Romania goes ahead with a rather radical privatisation and reform policy whilst 
Bulgaria is just staggering out of a major economic crisis. Finally, Belarus and Ukraine, have 
struggled to introduce political and economic reforms, so far not very successfully. In this 
process Ukraine has become more westward looking whilst Belarus more eastward looking in 
terms of strategic alliances.
Whilst the political and military elite planned new meetings and alliances, the introduction of 
democratically elected governments meant that more attention had to be paid to the attitudes 
and values of the population. What was their opinion? Who did they see as friends and 
enemies? The answers to these questions can be gained by looking at survey data making 
comparisons between countries and across time. Here we analyse New Democracies 
Barometer (NDB) data in the following countries: Poland, Czech and Slovak Republics, 
Hungary, Belarus, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia and Croatia. The survey of a 
representative sample of approximately 1000 respondents from each country has been
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carried out each year since 1992. Out of these ten countries, nine have been members of 
the former military transnational organisation of the Warsaw Pact; only Romania was not part 
of that transnational military organisation of European Communism after the Second World 
War. Some of the new democracies were part of other states before 1989, but they all share 
the Warsaw Pact historical experience. The end of the Warsaw Pact left a military vacuum 
between Slovenia and Ukraine, which is now a much-debated topic in international politics.
Sources of insecurity
a. Neighbouring countries
What are the sources of threat for Central European post-Communist peoples? Historically 
this region has been a buffer zone between different Empires: French, German, Austrian, 
Russian/Soviet and Turkish Empires all came and went fighting different battles and imposing 
different kinds of rule. Borders and boundaries were changed many times, countries were 
created, countries were destroyed or countries were simply moved to a different place. The 
population comprises a complex patchwork of different ethnic groups, speaking many 
different languages, many of which have been very persistent over time despite the comings 
and goings of various rulers. With the nationalistic movements arising during the nineteenth 
century, many of the people’s of Central Europe were able to codify and further establish 
their literary and cultural heritage and claim their own nationhood with geographical borders 
(Gellner 1983). But given the history of the region, these borders were always disputed. The 
recognition of the existing borders therefore (however arbitrarily drawn) was one of the first 
key security issues of the post-1989 settlement. This has been an issue in every post- 
Communist central European country where neighbours can make historically justified claims 
upon territory - in other words, all of them. Neighbouring countries therefore pose a potential 
threat to the security of post-Communist states which are no longer protected by grand 
strategic alliances.
b. Great powers
The two most bruising experiences of invasion by different empires in recent memory was 
that of Germany from the West and Russia or the Soviet Union from the East. Central 
Europeans have very vivid memories of the brutal invasion of Germany during the 1930s and 
the massive destruction of people and homes which took place as a result. Fear of threat 
from Germany is therefore still a very lively issue. Central Europeans have equally bitter 
memories of their subsequent ‘liberation’ by the Soviet troops from the East who did not leave 
again for another 45 years. Countries which had been allies of Germany were punished and 
although this regime was not as bloodthirsty in most countries as had been the previous 
occupation by Germans, the political and economic straightjacket imposed by Communist 
systems and the appropriation of property and political freedoms was bitterly resented, 
leading to a string of uprisings in these countries over the post-Second World War period. A
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very tangible evidence of the Soviet presence was provided by the presence of large 
numbers of troops and military manoeuvres to protect the Western Frontier of the Soviet 
Empire. These troops were also used to suppress internal uprisings such as that in 1968 in 
the Czech Republic and in 1956 in Hungary and in 1953 inEastern Germany. The 
disintegration of the Soviet Union has curbed the threats originating from the East helped to 
ensure the independence of the Central European countries, but the political uncertainty and 
instability in Russia means that it is still potentially a threat for these small recreated nations. 
Although Russians themselves may be unwilling to re-create the military ambitions of the 
former Soviet Union (see Rose 1997) demagogic politicians such as Zirinovksy have the 
power to stir up popular feelings.
Although Germany and Russia are the two most immediate great powers to threaten Central 
European countries, the other great power which has been part of the global division of 
Communism and Capitalism is the USA. The USA also stationed troops across the border in 
Western Europe, undertook military manoeuvres and trained its missiles on Central and 
Eastern European cities. The collapse of the Soviet Empire is often seen as a victory for the 
Americans. America exerts a considerable influence in Central Europe through business 
investment, the cultural dominance of consumer culture and Hollywood movies and through 
sending in various experts to help transform the political and economic systems of Central 
Europe. The US, traditionally portrayed as the enemy of Communism, might still be perceived 
as a threat in Central European countries.
c. National minorities and ethnic groups
Despite the various forms of deportation or destruction of ethnic populations .which have 
taken place over the last seventy years, each country contains ethnic populations and 
minorities from other countries as well as its own (Gellner 1994). For each country, the 
national minorities belonging to the neighbouring country can be used to de-stabilise rather 
fragile regimes, as was done when Germany invaded Czechoslovakia in 1938 to 'save' the 
ethnic Germans who were living there and was done by both Serbia and Croatia in the 
recent war in Yugoslavia. These national minorities can therefore be seen as a kind of 'fifth 
column’ inside the country. There is also a particular problem with what Gellner (1995) 
termed 'dominant minorities’; that is, the minority populations which had previously been 
dominant ethnic groups but which the receding tide of empire had left behind. These 
dominant minorities often regard themselves as superior to the other people in the countries 
in which they live and are not very inclined to accept a lesser minority status. Examples of 
these are Russians in the Baltic States or Ukraine and Hungarians in Romania or Serbs and 
Croats in Bosnia.
The post-Cold War period has seen the eruption of various ethnic conflicts in the region and 
for the first time, the persecution of minorities such as gypsies and Muslims (which was 
always widespread) has become more publicised (Transitions 1997). Furthermore, ethnic
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minorities are seeking to find their own voice within the newly constructed states and this is 
often resisted by political leaders. In some cases these ethnic minorities are well established 
and form highly articulate lobbies for use of their own language, their own education, their 
own representation in the political system, as is the case of the Hungarians in Romania. 
However, new ethnic groups have been discovered or re-discovered as part of the 
liberalisation process and perhaps as a consequence of global tendencies towards multi- 
culturalism. Examples in the Central European Region would be the German minority in 
Poland, believed not to exist only eight years ago, but which have now formed their own 
political party. Other examples are the Ruthenians in trans-Carpathia whose cause has been 
espoused by a small number of local intellectuals and a non-local Canadian academic (Hann 
1995). There is a potent dynamic which involves the co-variance of nationalising groups, 
minorities living in other countries and newly emergent countries (Rogers Brubaker 1996). 
For these reasons, minorities can be a threat to the internal security of the country.
d. Escalating migration
In the past, movement around the countries of Central Europe was very restricted, even for 
their own citizens and even more restricted for outsiders. The Iron Curtain sealed off these 
countries from East-West movements. However, the dismantling of the Iron Curtain has 
resulted in new population flows and new forms of mobility. The traditional flow of movement 
has been from East to West and this continues with Central Europeans working, studying and 
visiting European Union countries either legally or illegally (Fassmann and Münz 1994). 
Citizens from the countries bordering the European Union can cross the 'green line’ without 
much restriction in any case. Tourists and shoppers travel in large numbers across the 
borders from West to East. However, the opening of borders also liberalised movement 
around the Central European region as large numbers of Russians and Ukrainians or people 
from even further afield arrive to work, to shop or to trade in the more prosperous countries of 
post-Communist Central Europe. Increasing discrepancies in the economic fortunes of the 
different post-Communist countries encourages this flow of people (Wallace et al. 1996, 
1998). The main recipients of these new flows of people from the East have been the 
Central European countries of Poland, Hungary Czech and Slovak Republics. In addition to 
people coming to work or trade, these countries started to become transit countries for 
migrants from outside the region trying to get into Western Europe - from China, from 
Pakistan and from Africa, for example. Tens of thousands were turned back from the border 
to were sent back to the last country which they entered - mostly the post-Communist 
countries of Central Europe. These became transit countries not just for illegal migrants but 
also for criminal networks in arms, drugs, prostitution and stolen art dealing. The European 
Union, keen to keep its borders safe and stable has been active in helping to deal with these 
problems, involving increasing co-operation and intervention in the counties of Central 
Europe. In economic terms and in terms of migration these countries form a new kind of 
‘buffer zone’ between East and West.
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For many business men from further East, it is more convenient to set up operations in the 
cheaper but also less institutionalised and more corruption-prone post-Communist countries 
than to go directly into Western Europe and these Central European countries have therefore 
become communications points in this respect (Wallace et al. 1996). Many Western 
companies and western investors have also started to move into Central Europe, bringing 
their own strata of professional employees with them. Western European and US shops, 
banks and businesses have become increasingly common.
For people in Central European countries the increase in migration has coincided with an 
increase in crime and these two things are linked in the minds of many people. Furthermore, 
a wave of asylum seekers and refugees (not always officially declaring themselves as such) 
hit the Visegrad countries after the war broke out in Yugoslavia and after European Union 
countries started closing their doors to these refugees in 1992.
The Central European post-Communist countries have therefore experienced an influx of 
migrations and temporary mobility, unknown for some fifty years. This can also be seen as 
source of threat and insecurity even though the numbers are relatively and absolutely small 
compared to many Western European countries. The more affluent countries of the 'Buffer 
Zone’ - Poland, Hungary, Czech and Slovak Republics - have been the main targets of this 
migration both because of their borders with the European Union and because of their 
relative affluence and political stability compared with other countries to the East and South.
Who are friends and who are enemies?
The change described above have left the countries of Post-Communist Central Europe with 
the need to re-think their alliances. Their relatively weak position in political, economic and 
military terms means that they are vulnerable to many influences. They are mostly relatively 
small countries with unstable borders which enhances this vulnerability. The strengthening 
and deepening of ties within the European Union creates a strong block on the Western side 
although the military Union has not been pursued, despite some discussions. The European 
Union represents a strong economic pole of attraction into whose orbit the countries of 
Central Europe are drawn whether they like it or not (Wallace et al. 1997). Many of them 
aspire to join the European Union, although negotiations are underway to admit only five 
candidates: Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia and Estonia..
The continuing military strength of Russia to the East is illustrated by its intervention in 
Chechenya, Moldova and the Caucasus as well as sabre rattling over the Black Sea fleet. To 
the west, NATO continues to be a strong military global force. The countries of Central 
Europe are caught in the middle with little military clout. Not surprisingly, many post- 
Communist Central European countries also aspire to joining NATO, although only three - 
Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary - are being admitted (depending upon the results of 
further negotiations and a referendum in Hungary).
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Other strategic alliances have been proposed or constructed but do not seem to carry the 
same political, economic or military weight: CEFTA(Central European Free Trade Area) CEI 
(Central European Initiative), CSCE (Council for Security and Co-operation in Europe), the 
Baltic Council and the Council of Europe are all examples (Cowen Karp 1993).
For this reason it is important to look at who the people of Central Europe regard as their 
friends and enemies in the new reordering of Europe. This forms the next part of the paper.
1. Perceptions of threat
One crucial question of the future stability or instability of the historically shattered European 
region is the form and the speed of integration into different forms of military co-operation. 
The question of military integration is closely linked with the different perceptions of threat in 
the 10 post-Communist countries, which are the territorial focus of the analysis. The New 
Democracies Barometer asked in 1992 (=NDB II) and in 1996 (=NDB IV), which countries or 
other actors pose a threat to the country of the respondent. The results for the average of all 
10 countries show a rather clear picture (see Table 1):
Table 1:
"Do you think any of these factors poses a threat or no threat to peace and security in this 
society?”
Subjective Threat 1992-6
100 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
90 
80 •
70
The greatest threat from a mass public perspective for the post-Communist countries 
between Zagreb and Kiev appears to be Russia. The percentage of Eastern Europeans, who 
regard Russia as a threat to their homeland, went up from 29 per cent in 1992 to 39 per cent
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in 1996. On the other hand, 61 per cent of all Eastern European respondents think that 
Russia poses no threat to their country. The second international danger for those former 
countries of the demised Warsaw Pact are the neighbouring countries. In 1992, 49 per cent 
of all post-Communist citizens were afraid of some of their neighbours, this proportion went 
down in the following 6 years to 28 per cent in 1996. One can assume that roughly one third 
of Eastern Europeans are afraid of some neighbouring states although the subjective threat 
by one’s neighbours decreased from one half to one third over time. In 1996, 72 per cent of 
post-Communist citizens believe that their neighbours form no military threat to them any 
more. This may be because most of the borders between and around post-Communist 
countries have now been confirmed through international treaties, thus reducing the 
possibility of dispute over territory. However a number of disputed borders and territories in 
the region also remain unresolved.
The third strongest danger for this part of the world are minorities and ethnic groups within 
the country. In 1992, 40 per cent of all East Europeans felt threatened by minorities and 
ethnic groups inside their own country, but that number fell to 25 per cent in 1996. As with 
neighbouring states, the fear of instability caused by ethnic groups within the country cooled 
down in the first half of the 90’s considerably. In 1996, 75 per cent of all post-Communist 
citizens expressed no anxieties about ethnic groups or minorities threatening the internal 
peace and stability of their own country. A similar longitudinal pattern appears with regard to 
threat from immigrants and refugees. In 1992, 36 per cent of all East Europeans were quite 
nervous about migrants 'flooding' their country and producing thus political and social 
instability, but that share went down to 22 per cent in 1996, which is still quite high, but the 
trend is definitely downwards during the observed period.
The 'German threat’ and the 'American threat’ is much lower compared with the Russian 
Federation, the neighbour states, internal minorities or external migrants, but nevertheless 
we can speak of some individual or group anxiety about potential actions by Germany or the 
United States of America. One Fifth of all post-Communist citizens regard Germany as a 
threat to their country, a percentage which is constant over time. On the other hand, 80 per 
cent of all Eastern Europeans do not see any danger arising from Germany’s ambitions 
towards the East. In 1992, only 8 per cent associated some danger with the USA, but that 
share increased to 15 per cent in 1996. Over time, more Eastern Europeans feel threatened 
by US foreign policy.
In an overview of the subjective perceptions of military threat one might argue that on the one 
hand, the fear of threat by 'great powers’ Germany, America and especially Russia - had 
grown between 1992 and 1996. There could be a growing strategic cleavage in Central and 
Eastern Europe, at least in the mind of the post-Communist peoples in the region. On the 
other hand, the anxieties concerning destabilising effects caused by neighbouring countries, 
by internal minorities or external migrants lost their impact upon the ordinary citizens in 
Eastern Europe and are recently less pressing than in 1992.
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This is in contrast to results reported for Russia, where it is internal minorities and other 
republics of the former USSR which is the main cause for anxiety (Rose 1997b).
Next we turn to more detailed analyses of who is afraid of Russia, Germany and America.
2. Who is afraid of Russia ?
The leading group with extremely high levels of military distrust about the Russian Federation 
and their future strategic intentions is Croatia and Poland. The feeling of being threatened by 
the Russian Federation is highest in Croatia (see Table 2). In 1992, 33 per cent of the 
Croatian population expressed some anxiety about the Russian Federation and their 
strategic intentions. That share increased tremendously over time and reached the level of 71 
per cent of Croatians in 1996. One explanation for this steep increase could be the open 
support of the Russian Federation for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during the war in 
Bosnia.
The other nation which also feels threatened by Russia, is Poland. The high level of Polish 
mistrust about the Russian military potential was constant over time with 66 per cent of the 
Polish population expressing fear about Russia in 1992, and 71 per cent of the Poles with the 
same feeling of Russian threat in 1996. Only one third of the Polish people do not feel 
threatened by their Eastern neighbour Russia.
The second group of post-Communist countries with high levels of military distrust about 
future Russian intentions are the Czech Republic, Romania, and Slovakia. In 1992, 39 per 
cent of the Czech population felt threatened by Russia, a share, which increased quite 
considerably to 55 per cent in 1996. In Romania, 62 per cent of the Romanian respondents 
expressed some anxiety about perceived Russian military intentions in 1992. This Romanian 
fear of future Russian military activities decreased to 55 per cent in 1996, hence displaying 
now the same level of military distrust towards the Russian Federation like the Czech 
Republic. In Slovakia, the scepticism of the Slovakian mass public about future Russian 
military strategies grew considerably over time. In 1992, 26 per cent of the population felt 
threatened by Russia, a share, which increased up to 51 per cent in 1996. Therefore we 
cannot speak cannot speak of increasing friendship and closeness between Slovakia and the 
Russian Federation in security terms, at least not at the level of the ordinary citizens in 
Slovakia.
Romanians also feel threatened by Russia and this could be on account of the military 
interventions of the Soviet/Russian Fourteenth Army in 1992 in neighbouring transdenistren 
province of Moldova, which is ethnically similar to Romania and formerly a part of Romania. 
By 1996, hostilities there had ceased. It could also be a legacy of the anti-Russian stance of 
the Ceauceauscu regime.
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Table 2:
“Do you think Russia poses a threat (=big threat + some threat) to peace and security in this 
society?"
In Hungary, the feeling of military threat by Russia grew over time too. In 1992, only 13 per 
cent of the Hungarians felt threatened by Russia. This changed in the first half of the 90’s 
with the effect that 30 per cent of the Hungarian population is quite concerned about the 
'Russian danger’ in 1996. The extent of military distrust concerning Russia increased sharply 
in Slovenia. In 1992, only 3 per cent of the Slovenian population was afraid of the Russians, 
whereas more than one fifth of the Slovenes (21 per cent) felt threatened by Russia in 1996. 
As with Croatia, the high level of military distrust in Slovenia seems to be linked with the 
Russian military and political affiliation with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in general and 
the Serbian nationality in particular.
However, it is also rather surprising that fear of Russia actually grew in most of the Central 
European countries, since they do not have direct borders with Russia (except in the case of 
Poland) and since the Soviet troops had all left by 1996. In the countries which have direct 
borders with Russia and towards which Russia was making various claims, there was much 
less fear of their traditionally dominating Eastern neighbour.
The situation in the post-Soviet countries such as Belarus and Ukraine is, as along many 
other attitudinal dimensions, quite different. In Ukraine, only 17 per cent of the Ukrainian 
population is nervous about the Russian military in 1996. A similar picture emerges in 
Belarus, where 15 per cent express some anxiety about future Russian military intentions. 
The level of a perceived Russian military threat in both former Soviet Republics is constant 
over time. Bulgaria is strikingly free of any feeling of threat from Russia: 5 per cent of the
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Bulgarians feels threatened by Russia, whereas 95 per cent of the Bulgarian population show 
no military nervousness about the Russian Federation whatsoever. Like in many other fields 
of attitudes in post-Communist Europe, a high level of attitudinal homogeneity can be noticed 
between the post-Soviet countries Belarus and Ukraine on the one hand and Bulgaria on the 
other hand.
The analysis of different levels of trust and distrust concerning the military strategy of the 
Russian Federation in the future, showed that the countries which were in the process of 
joining the NATO in 1997 also have quite high levels of military distrust about Russian military 
intentions: Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary. The top position of Croatia in the anti- 
Russian league can be explained by the war situation in the territory of former Yugoslavia, in 
that respect, Croatia, Bosnia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia are still ‘societies in war’ 
and cannot be compared with other post-Communist societies in transformation. In terms of 
the subjective feeling of threat by the mass population, Romania would also qualify as 
member of NATO, a view which was evidently shared by some European countries, but not 
by the USA. The military climate of the Slovakian population is in stark contrast to the images 
of pro-Russian feelings in Slovakia, which are presented frequently in the Western press, but 
are definitely wrong in that aspect of international integration.
With regard to perceptions of threat from Russia, there was therefore a division among the 
countries under consideration. Some feared Russia and their fear was growing, but these 
were the countries most far away from Russia. Other countries did not fear Russia and their 
fear was even declining - these were the countries closest geographically, linguistically and 
politically to Russia.
3. Who is afraid of Germany ?
The perceived threat by Germany is constant over time: one fifth of the Eastern European 
populations think that Germany is posing a threat to peace and security to their home country 
(20 per cent in 1996), however, different countries feared Germany at different periods,. The 
highest level of anti-German feelings in strategic terms is visible in two neighbouring states of 
Germany, in Poland and in the Czech Republic. In 1996, 45 per cent of the Polish population 
and 44 per cent of the Czech population felt subjectively threatened by Germany. Poland and 
the Czech Republic display the same level of anti-German feelings, but this is a result of 
divergent trends. In Poland we had a extremely high level of public distrust towards Germany 
in 1992, when 70 per cent of the Polish population expressed fears about potential military 
intentions on Germany. That enormous extent of anti-German feelings went down in the 
course of the first half of the 90’s to 45 per cent, which is still considerable and not to be 
underestimated. Hence, we are entitled to speak of an erosion of anti-German feelings in 
Poland by 25 percentage points, but in the Czech Republic the trend is reverse. In 1992, 38 
per cent of the Czech mass public distrusted Germany concerning her strategic intentions, a 
figure which went up to 44 per cent in 1996. Thus, we notice a rise of anti-German feelings
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from a military-strategic point of view in the Czech Republic by 6 percentage points between 
the beginning and the middle of the 90’s.
Table 3:
Perceived Treat by Germany:
"Do you think, Germany poses a threat or no threat to peace and security in this society?"
As in the Czech Republic, anti-German sentiments concerning the military dimension are 
rising in Slovakia too. In 1992, 21 per cent of the Slovakian population thought that Germany 
posed a threat to Slovakia, which increased to 32 per cent in 1996. Hence, we can argue 
that one third of Slovakian society has serious concerns about the 'German danger' in 1996. 
A similar pattern is visible in Croatia, but on a lower general level. In 1992, only 3 per cent of 
the Croatian population was afraid of Germany. This coincided with the strong German and 
Austrian diplomatic support for Croatian independence during that period, which was seen 
very favourably by the Croatian public. In 1996 however, the picture had changed 
considerably. At the later time we find 23 per cent of the Croatian sample expressing fears 
about the military potential of Germany, maybe in relation with the peace-keeping and peace- 
enforcing operations in that region, which involved German combat troops for the first time 
ever since the end of World War II . There was a 20 percentage point rise in Croatian anti- 
German feelings, which is quite remarkable in comparison with other countries. The military 
threat of Germany is also more visible in Belarus, where 21 per cent feel a certain military 
threat arising from Germany in 1996.
In Romania, one can see 15 per cent of the population concerned about the German military 
power in 1996, which is constant over time. The perception of German military potential grew 
in Ukraine from 3 per cent in 1992 up to 12 per cent in 1996, whereas the Hungarians display
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no clear fear of German military power: only 5 per cent of the Hungarian population think that 
Germany poses a threat to Hungary, which is negligible. The same goes for Slovenia, where 
5 per cent associate some danger with the German military potential. Finally, in Bulgaria we 
do not find any anti-German feelings from the military point of view at all.
In general, fewer people feared Germany than feared Russia, but this fear was growing 
among some countries. Some of those countries who most feared Russia also feared 
Germany; for them the neighbouring 'great powers' were a threat.
4. Who is afraid of America?
The perception of military threat exerted by the USA is the lowest of all security risks within 
Central and Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, the percentage of Eastern Europeans concerned 
about the military power of the United States of America grew from 8 per cent in 1992 to 15 
per cent in 1996. As a consequence of the military events in the territory of former Yugoslavia 
in the first half of the nineties, Croatia displays the highest level of military distrust concerning 
the USA. In 1992, only 8 per cent of the Croatian population felt the USA being a threat to the 
Croatian state, whereas we find 29 per cent of the adult Croatian population in 1996 are 
anxious about the American military power and her possible effects upon Croatia and her 
geopolitical position. In Belarus, the anti-American feelings increased from 13 per cent in 
1992 to 24 per cent in 1996. Recently, one fourth of the Belorussians think that the USA is a 
real danger for Belarus, a phenomenon which could be linked eventually with the close 
strategic alliance between the Russian Federation and Belarus in the last two years. In 
Slovakia, one could notice a considerable rise in anti-American feelings since the early 90’s. 
In 1992, only 5 per cent of the Slovakian population felt threatened by the USA, that figure 
increased to 22 per cent in 1996. Now, more than one fifth of the Slovakian population is 
concerned about the American military potential and possible effects upon Slovakian 
security. This change in the Slovakian public mood could be an outcome of domestic 
Slovakian politics and the basic ideological orientations of the current political regime in 
Bratislava. In Ukraine we find a similar development as in Belarus, a very low level of anti- 
American sentiments at the beginning of the transformation process (4 per cent in 1992) and 
a steep increase of up to 16 per cent of Ukrainians nervous about American military power in 
1996.
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Table 4:
"Do you think, the USA poses a threat (=big threat +some threat) to peace and security in this 
society?”
In four of the countries under consideration, roughly one tenth of the population displays 
some fears about the military power of the USA. These are Czech Republic, Romania, 
Bulgaria and Poland. The vast majority of people in those countries - around 90 per cent - are 
not afraid of America or American military potential. Nevertheless, one should note that the 
very low level of anti-American feelings in those four countries is growing steadily to higher 
levels, a trend which should be observed in the future. In Hungary and Slovenia, virtually 
nobody is afraid of the Americans.
Therefore, in most countries fear of the USA had also grown, although it remains at far lower 
levels than fear of either Russia or Germany.
5. Who is afraid of neighbouring countries?
The second biggest military threat after Russia comes from the respective neighbouring 
states. However, an important finding is that the immediate threat at the borders seems to be 
less strong and frightening than at the beginning of the 90’s. (see. Table 5).
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Table 5:
"Do you think, the neighbouring countries pose a threat (=big threat + some threat) to peace 
and security in this society?"
Threat by neighbouring countries: 1992-1996
H 1992 
■  1996
Again, the situation in the territory of former Yugoslavia is very different and undoubtedly 
influenced by the armed conflicts following the dissolution of Yugoslavia. The absolute 
majority of the Slovenes (60 per cent) and of the Croatians (55 per cent) are afraid of the 
Serbians in Bosnia-Herzegovina and of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. That subjective 
perception of a Serbian threat has decreased only slightly since 1992.
The country occupying third place amongst those most threatened by their neighbours is 
Hungary. In 1992, 64 per cent of the Hungarian population felt threatened by their 
neighbours. This Hungarian strategic 'complex’ concerning her neighbours cooled down to 48 
per cent in 1996. Nevertheless, we have to see that still have the Hungarian population is 
afraid of their neighbours. This could be an outcome of the proximity of Hungary to the 
armed conflicts taking place in the former Yugoslavia and the large number of refugees who 
fled across into Hungary. It is also the case that Hungarian ethnic minorities live over the 
border in most directions and this could give Hungarians a special sensitivity to the situation 
in their neighbouring countries. Most notably, there has been some tension between the 
Romanian government and the Hungarian minority who are living there and the same is the 
case for Slovakia.
A similar picture of strategic landscapes appears in Slovakia, which happens to be a 
neighbour of Hungary with a considerable Hungarian minority in Southern Slovakia. In 1992,
I H S — Haerpfer and Wallace / Subjective Insecurity in Post-Communist Eastern Europe — 15
46 per cent of the Slovakian mass public felt threatened by their neighbours. That share of 
ordinary Slovakians nervous about potential military activities in the neighbourhood 
decreased to 36 per cent in 1996, which is still clearly more than one third of the adult 
Slovakian population. This mood of threat is exacerbated in Slovakia by domestic politicians 
and proposals, for example by Meciar, of a population exchange with Hungary of ethnic 
Hungarians and Slovaks.
In Romania, the general feeling of threat by the neighbouring states decreased during the 
90’s. In 1992, the enormous majority of 67 per cent of Romanians felt threatened by their 
neighbours, whereas this was only only 35 per cent in 1996. This change could be because 
of the military tensions in Moldova in the early 1990s which have since become more 
peaceful and the greater harmonisation of relations with Hungary. Despite this obvious 
growth in Romanian confidence, we can see that there are still more than one third of 
Romanian women and men, who felt some threat from neighbouring states.
We found also a high level of military distrust towards neighbouring states in Bulgaria. In 
1992, 61 per cent of the Bulgarians expressed their doubts about the peaceful intentions of 
the neighbours, thus displaying a high degree of nervousness about their immediate 
neighbourhood. The widespread strategic anxiety within the Bulgarian mass public at the 
beginning of the 90’s calmed down in the following years with the effect that we find only less 
than one third of Bulgarians (31 per cent), which are still anxious about the military intentions 
of their neighbouring states in 1996. The war in Yugoslavia, taking place just over the 
Bulgarian border, and its cessation may have affected these attitudes.
A very low level of military anxiety can be found in Poland (15 per cent), the Czech Republic 
(14 per cent), Belarus (11 per cent) and Ukraine (9 per cent). The stabilisation of the military 
thinking of the population is quite remarkable in Poland, where 63 per cent felt threatened by 
the Polish neighbours in 1992 - one could speak of high level of alertness on the brink of 
being alarmed. The relative strategic stabilisation in the Baltic countries, Belarus and Ukraine 
in the period between 1992 and 1996 perhaps had a calming effect on the Polish populace. 
A similar, but less dramatic development occurred in the Czech Republic. In 1992, 36 per 
cent of the Czech population were afraid of the Czech neighbours. That share decreased 
during the first half of the 90’s to 14 per cent, which showed that the Czech mass public 
became more and more relaxed about the perceived military intentions of their neighbours. 
One interpretation of the high level of military confidence and a corresponding low level of 
military anxiety about neighbouring states in Belarus could be that the strategic closeness of 
Belarus to Russia produced a feeling of territorial security in that former Soviet Republic.
6. Internal threats: who is afraid of ethnic groups and minorities
If one analyses the perceived threat exerted by ethnic groups and minorities to internal 
stability and security across Eastern Europe, the first outcome is that ethnic tensions in that
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region seem to have calmed down somewhat, at least in most of the countries. The average 
for all NDB-countries went down from 40 per cent feeling threatened in 1992 to 25 per cent 
under subjective threat in 1996, which leaves nevertheless one quarter of all Eastern 
Europeans, who think that internal security is threatened by ethnic minorities in their country 
(see Table 6).
The country with the highest level of ethnic tensions appears to be Slovakia. One half of the 
Slovakian population (48 per cent in 1996) has the impression that ethnic minorities pose a 
threat to peace and security in Slovakia, That share of Slovakians concerned about ethnic 
groups remained constant over time. The is perhaps the consequence of the on-going 
problems with the Hungarian minority of about 500 000 on the southern border who are 
seeking the use of their own language in the region in opposition to the policies of the Slovak 
government. The second highest level of subjective ethnic threat can be found in Croatia. In 
1992 57 per cent of the Croatian population felt threatened by ethnic minorities, especially 
Serbs and other ethnic groups on the other side of the war. That percentage went down to 40 
per cent in 1996, but must regarded still as quite high by comparison with other post- 
Communist societies. Croatia seems to be still a society at war, but the first signs of 
normalisation are visible. The subjective level of ethnic threat is also quite high in Bulgaria 
with the unsolved Turkish question and in Romania with strong Hungarian minorities in 
Western Romania. These are all countries with what might be termed ‘dominant minorities'. 
Those countries whose populations contain 'dominant minorities' are the ones with the 
strongest perception of internal insecurity from this source.
Table 6
“Do you think, that ethnic groups and minorities within our country pose a threat (=big threat 
+ some threat) to peace and security in this society?"
Threat from minorities and ethnic groups: 1992-1996
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Slovenia is the only country, where the level of subjective ethnic distrust went up between 
1992 and 1996 from 14 per cent to 20 per cent, albeit at a quite low general level. In the 
remaining countries such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Belarus, the Ukraine and Poland, 
the level of ethnic threats within societies from minorities towards the majorities, decreased 
considerably. In the Czech Republic we witness a fall from 44 per cent Czechs feeling 
threatened by Czech ethnic groups in 1992 to 15 per cent in 1996. Much of this is because 
of the separation from Slovakia, where the most of the ethnic minorities in the former 
Czechoslovakia were living. In Hungary, the downward tendency is not as steep as in the 
Czech Republic: 26 per cent of Hungarians felt threatened by ethnic groups in 1992, 
compared to only 15 percent of the Hungarian population in 1996.
In Belarus and Ukraine the attitudinal pattern of anxieties about ethnic groups producing 
internal insecurity is again similar: In both countries 14 per cent feel threatened by ethnic 
minorities in 1996. In both post-Soviet countries the level of subjective ethnic tensions within 
the mass public fell considerably since 1992. An interesting outcome of that part of analysis 
is that Poland is the post-Communist country with the lowest levels of subjective ethnic 
insecurity in 1996. The anxiety of minorities endangering peace and stability of Polish society 
was with 37 per cent quite high in 1992. Since then, we seem to observe a definite cooling 
down of ethnic tensions in Poland. If this is a stable trend, we will be able to decide only by 
measuring the same phenomenon in future New Democracies Barometers.
7. Who is afraid of migrants and refugees?
An interesting question in the panorama of potential or real threats to Eastern European 
societies is the perception of migrants moving between different countries, especially 
between what we have described as the Central European buffer zone ( Poland, Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia) and Western Europe on the one hand and 
between the buffer zone and Eastern Europe on the other hand. The threat by migrants was 
expressed by 36 per cent of all Eastern Europeans in 1992, but went down to 22 per cent in 
1996. As in the case of ethnic minorities within post-Communist societies, the fear of 
migrants as a threat to the peace and security of the country decreased from one third to one 
fifth of the Eastern European mass public.
The highest level of concern about migrants and refugees can be found in Croatia with the 
special problem of war refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina escaping to Croatia, Slovenia, 
Austria and Germany. The re-migration process from Germany and Austria has started, but 
puts necessarily additional demographic pressure upon Slovenia and Croatia. In 1992, 59 per 
cent of all Croatians felt threatened by migrants from other part of former Yugoslavia. This 
figure fell to 34 per cent in 1996, which is still the highest value all over Central and Eastern 
Europe. The second highest level of anxieties about migrants was found in Hungary, one of 
the main 'Buffer zone’ countries. The perceived threat by migrants for Hungary went down 
from 51 per cent of the population concerned in 1992 to 33 per cent of the Hungarian public
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in 1996. Hungary was also the country which received the most refugees from the former 
Yugoslavia of all countries outside of the former Yugoslavia itself (Fullerton, Sik and Toth 
1995).
Table 7:
“Do you think, immigrants and refugees from other societies pose a threat (=big threat + 
some threat) or no threat to peace and security to this country?”
j 70
Slovakia is one of the only countries, together with Ukraine, where the anxiety about 
incoming migrants and refugees grew over time. In 1992, 23 per cent of the Slovakians felt 
threatened by migrants, this figure rose to 28 per cent in 1996, putting Slovakia on the third 
position in the scale of anxiety about migrants. This is surprising, since Slovakia receives 
relatively few migrants compared with her neighbours (Wallace, Chmouliar and Sidorenko, 
1997), but may reflect the rising xenophobic rhetoric of the political leaders there. Originally, 
the aversion against migrants was much higher in their Czech Republic than in Slovakia, but 
anti-migrant feeling went down from 38 per cent in 1992 to 26 per cent in 1996, falling below 
the Slovakian level of anti-migrant feelings within the population. Slovenia was in 1992 in a 
completely different position due to the war and the massive flows of migrants and war 
refugees following the collapse of Yugoslavia. The substantial migration between Slovenia, 
Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and other former Republics of Yugoslavia produced in 1992 the 
result that 61 per cent of the Slovenian society felt threatened by migrants and refugees. This 
was a real and not an imagined danger within Slovenia, but also in Croatia.
I H S — Haerpfer and Wallace / Subjective Insecurity in Post-Communist Eastern Europe — 19
In Belarus, the fear of migrants is well below the NDB-average and with one fifth of the 
Belorussian society constant over time. In 1996, 19 per cent of the Belorussian sample 
indicate that they feel threatened by migrants and refugees. In Poland we encounter again 
the process of 'normalisation': in 1992, 41 per cent of the Polish population was quite 
concerned about the migration pressure, whereas only 14 per cent of the Polish mass public 
was still nervous about migrants and refugees threatening peace and order in Polish society 
in 1996. In Bulgaria, Romania and the Ukraine we find similarly low levels of a perceived 
threat by migrants as in Poland with values around 13 per cent, whereas 90 per cent in 
those four countries are quite relaxed about migrants. One explanation for that outcome 
could be that these countries are the ones sending rather than receiving migrants.
Subjective Insecurity Index
Putting together all these sources of insecurity, we developed an index in order to measure 
how insecure in general each country was feeling1. The results are presented in Tables 8 
and 9.
Table 8
Relative insecurity of different countries: combined index
The subjective threat index shows that Croatia is the most insecure country in terms of the 
anxieties of the population. Out of a maximum value of 60, Croatia scored 55, which means 
that it was the most subjectively insecure country in nearly all of the fields we have been
1 The Index w as constructed by assigning a score of 1 to  those countries w ho ranked 10,h in the lis t of 
countries on one dimension, a score o f 2 to  the coun try ranking 9 lh and so on so th a t those ranking firs t 
received a score o f 10. There were 6 dimensions: Fear o f neighbouring states; fear o f internal m inorities and 
ethnic groups; fear of refugees and m igrants; fear o f Germany, Russia and USA. The score fo r each country 
was then  added together to  give a measurement of how  insecure each coun try  fe lt overall. The m aximum  
score w as 60 and the m inimum  score 6.
Subjective Insecurity Index 1996
60
BSeriesI 
■  Serles2
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discussing. On account of the war, the people of Croatia feel threatened from all directions - 
from neighbouring countries, from great powers, and from internal insecurity engendered by 
migrants and minorities.
Table 9:
Ranking of most threatened countries
RANK-ORDER
Threat-
Index
Russia Neigh­bouring
States
Internal 
minorities 
and ehtnic 
groups
External
migrants
and
refugees
Germany USA
Maximum
value: 60
1. Croatia 55 1 2 2 1 4 1
2. Slovakia 47 5 4 1 3 3 3
3. Czech 
Republic
4. Romania
38
32
3
4
8
5
6
4
4
9
2
6
5
6
5. Poland 31 2 7 10 7 1 8
6. Hungary 31 6 3 7 2 8 9
7. Slovenia 29 7 1 5 5 9 10
8. Belarus 27 9 9 8 6 5 2
9. Bulgaria 22 10 6 3 8 10 7
10. Ukraine 18 8 10 9 10 7 4
Maximum
value: 6
Basis=ranks in 6 fields of threat
The second most anxious country was Slovakia, which also rated highly on both internal and 
external security threats. The increasing political isolation of Slovakia from the other Central 
European countries (its exclusion from membership discussions for NATO and for the 
European Union, as well as repeated warnings from the Council of Europe and from the 
European Commission with regard to various positions taken by the Slovak government) 
perhaps creates or exacerbates this sense of threat. Furthermore, the xenophobic and often 
aggressive rhetoric of the political leaders of Slovakia may have had some effect in 
generating an insecure atmosphere.
The third most anxious country in terms of subjective insecurity was the Czech Republic. It is 
mainly the people’s fear of great powers - Russia and Germany - which put the Czech 
Republic in this position.
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Romania, Poland, Hungary and Slovenia are all clustered together with between 32 and 29 
points each. In the case of Romania, Poland and Slovenia, there have been significant 
reductions in anxiety about military threat or internal destabilisation in recent years.
The final cluster of countries are the former Soviet states of Ukraine and Belarus and the 
country most sympathetic to them - Bulgaria. What is surprising is that this group of 
countries which have perhaps the most to fear from internal and external insecurity (Bulgaria 
has a continuing unresolved problem with its Turkish and muslim minorities) and who appear 
to be the most fragile and most recently constructed democracies are in fact the least worried 
about military insecurity. These are the least well established democracies but also the least 
fearful. .
Attitudes toward joining NATO
The feeling of insecurity may lead some post-Communist countries towards a desire to join 
NATO in order to secure their military position as part of a greater alliance. The fear of 
Russia may also make joining NATO a desirable objective.
In general a very high percentage of the population of post-Communist East-Central Europe 
wished to join NATO. On average 64% - nearly two thirds - of all the people combined saw 
joining NATO as beneficial. This rose to 90% in Romania and 86% in Slovenia and Poland. 
Croatia followed with three quarters of her population - 76% - having this opinion. The Czech 
Republic, Slovakia and Hungary were clustered together with around two thirds in favour of 
joining NATO.
Table 10:
Statement: ’’Becoming a member of NATO would be beneficial”
Percent favourable towards joining NATO 1996
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We can see that in general those countries who felt the least subjective insecurity - Ukraine, 
Bulgaria and Belarus - were also the ones least likely to want to join NATO. Belarus was the 
only country with a marjority - who thirds (69%) - against joining NATO. Nevertheless, one 
third of Bulgarians and Belarussians and more than one half of Ukrainians expressed a 
desire to join NATO. Whilst in all countries opinions were polarised between those who were 
for joining NATO and those who were against, in Bulgaria there was a very high number of 
'Don’t Knows’ - 39%. Perhaps this reflects the uncertainty in Bulgaria as to whether the 
country should be westwards or eastwards looking in its strategic alliances.
These results are corroborated by those of the United States Information Agency (USIA) 
which carries out regular surveys on security issues in these countries (USIA, 1997). Of 
people who said that they strongly favour or favour becoming a full member of NATO, they 
found Romanians (79%) were among the highest scorers followed by Slovenia with 71% and 
Poland with 72%. Next came Hungary (57%), Bulgaria (52%) Czech Republic (51%) and 
Slovakia (46%). This survey was also carried out in 1996 but did not include the former 
Soviet Republics of Ukraine and Belarus. They conclude that support for joining NATO is 
shallow and has declined since 1995. However, we would disagree wwith this conclusion. It 
seems to us that support is not shallow - it is very high and continues to be high despite 
some decline since 1995. More than half of most of the countries questioned wanted to 
become full members of NATO. However, USIA found that even if Central and Eastern 
European countries are keen to join NATO, they are not keen to assume the responsibilities 
of NATO membership including routine exercises in their country, having NATO troops 
stationed in their country, having regular overflights from NATO aircraft or sending troops to 
support another NATO ally. Furthermore, the large majority in each country favour social 
over military spending.
Ironically those countries who most desired to join NATO - Slovenia and Romania - are not 
the countries which have been accepted to the alliance. Although Bulgaria is to a great 
extent eastwards looking or ambivalent about its directions, neighbouring Romania is 
emphatically westwards looking. This is borne out in other indicators of economic and 
political orientation as well (Wallace 1997). Hungary and the Czech Republic, who have been 
accepted to the alliance, are not as enthusiastic about it as some of the other countries, 
falling below the mean for the whole group. The people of Poland on the other hand should 
feel pleased that they have been allowed to join - they are also very enthusiastic about it.
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What is the patterning of attitudes about security?
Our next task was to try to understand how differernt forms of feelings of insecurity are 
associated together. Are the same people worried about migrants and minorities as are 
worried about threats from surrounding countries or great powers? Or are these sources of 
insecurity actually quite different in the minds of the people of Eastern Europe? Another set 
of issues is how this sense of military insecurity may or may not be associated with economic 
insecurity. The rapid changes which have taken place in Eastern Europe have threatened 
the livelihood of many people which could have lead to some xenophobic reactions.
For this we carried out a factor analysis which cross correlated different sources of threat and 
some other important variables such as economic security and demographic variables: sex 
and education. We found three main patterns of threat: those who found everything 
threatening, those who saw only the “great powers” of America, Russia, Germany or 
neighbouring countries as a threat and those who saw Russia as the main threat. The latter 
group were sub-divided between who were well off and those who felt economically 
threatened in various ways. Altogether, this patterning explained 58.3% of the variance.
The first group were those threatened by everything. This group explained 15.8% of the 
variance. They score highly on each variable in or list of threats. However, on other 
indicators they did not score very highly. They were slightly more likely to be better educated 
but to have fewer consumer goods. We can say that this is a group of people who are 
anxious about all sources of military and security threat but they are not economically 
threatened. This general internal and external insecurity is not associated very much with 
anything else and this corresponds with findings in another analysis of this same survey 
looking in more detail at threat by migrants and minorities. A very anxious group existed, but 
their anxiety correlated only with other anxieties and not with socio-economic or demographic 
factors (Haerpfer and Wallace 1997). We could say that they were simply a very insecure 
group.
The second group were those who saw only the great powers - Germany, Russia and USA 
as threatening but not minority ethnic groups or migrants. They perceived threat only in terms 
of external insecurity. This group were not strongly associated with any particular socio­
economic or demographic characteristics either.
The third group were those who felt threatened strongly only by Russia. Those who felt that 
Russia was a threat to the peace and security of their country were negatively associated 
with feeling threat from the USA - that is, the more they felt threatened by Russia, the more 
they felt friendly towards the USA: Nor were they threatened by sources of internal insecurity 
- migrants and minority groups. However, they were quite likely to be men, lower educated. 
They were also very likely to feel economically threatened, having had to borrow money in 
the last year, experienced unemployment and to find the situation of their family today
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Table 9:
Factor Analysis of threat
Everything is 
threatening
Great 
Powers are 
threatening
Russia is 
threatening 
and 
economically 
threatened
Russia is 
threatening 
and 
economically 
threatened
Russia is 
threatening 
and 
NOT 
economically 
threatened
Threat by Russia .310 .559 .185 .146 .250
Threat by 
Germany .091 .888 .034 -.060 .047
Threat by USA .130 .819 -.099 -.050 -.189
Threat by
neighbouring
countries
.705 .239 .058 .101 .091
Threat by ethnic 
and minority 
groups
.834 .074 -.003 .017 -.067
Threat by 
immigrants and 
refugees
.751 .072 -.023 -.068 -.034
Sex: Male- 
female
.031 -.031 .170 .717 -.001
Education low- 
high .167 -.078 -.267 -.284 .424
Consumer 
goods index low- 
high
-.107 .031 .009 .068 .883
Experience of
unemployment
Yes-No
.026 -.006 -.323 .599 -.012
Enough money 
from regular job 
Yes- No
-.060 -.016 .772 .056 -.018
Saved-Borrowed
money .009 -.010 .652 -.188 -.077
Satisfactory- 
Unsatisfactory 
situation of 
family today
.044 .043 .806 .004 -.145
Variance
explained 15.8% 9% 18.4% 7.4% 7.8%
Variance explained overall: 58.3%
unsatisfactory. This group explained the highest amount of the variance-18.4%. The second 
sub group of people who felt threatened by Russia were also male, also low educated but did 
not show quite so strongly on the economically threatened indicators - for example they had
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been able to save rather than borrow money in the last year. The final group of those who felt 
threatened by Russia were not economically threatened at all - indeed they were rather 
economically secure. They were highly educated, had many consumer goods, had managed 
to save money in the last year and were satisfied with the economic situation. These were 
more affluent groups who nevertheless saw Russia as a threat. This explained 7.8% of the 
variance.
We could conclude therefore that in terms of the patterning of attitudes, one group were 
highly anxious and that for them all sources of threat - internal and external - were 
associated. The second group perceived only external but not internal threats. The third 
group were afraid of Russia but they fell into two distinct sub-groups. On the one hand there 
were un or lower educated men who were economically insecure who were likely to see 
Russia as a threat. On the other hand there was a group of educated and affluent people 
who also saw Russia as a threat. Seeing Russia as a threat is therefore associated for some 
with economic insecurity. However, threat of migrants and minorities was not (Haerpfer and 
Wallace 1997).
Conclusions
In general we can see that in the Post-Communist Central European countries the sense of 
threat from internal problems - migrants and ethnic minorities has generally gone down since 
1996. The same goes for feelings of threat from neighbouring states. The exceptions to this 
rule would be the countries affected by the recent war among the states that make up the 
former-Yugoslavia. However, a sense of threat from great powers has increased, most 
notably threat by Russia and Germany, followed by the USA,
What is also noticeable is that the region divides into distinct blocks. The former Soviet states 
have far less fear and anxiety than do the buffer zone states of Hungary, Poland, Czech and 
Slovak Republics. High anxiety can also be found amongst Romanians and Slovenians. 
These are the countries most eager to join the European Union and NATO. They are also 
the countries which have ‘westernised’ most in their economic and political reforms. They 
presumably feel themselves to be part of a western block.
By contrast, Belarus, Ukraine and Bulgaria feel themselves to be more part of an Eastern 
block of countries.
Croatia is in rather an untypical situation being a recent participant in war and people in 
Croatia are the most insecure in the region, although this insecurity has declined somewhat 
sinde 1992.
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Those feeling threatened can be subdivided into distinct groups. Firstly there are those who 
feel threatened by both internal and external factors, but their anxiety is not associated with 
anything else except anxiety. They are a very insecure group. The second group see only 
external powers or countries as a threat to peace and security. The third group see only 
Russia as being the problem and these were divided between lower educated men who were 
also economically insecure and higher educated people who were economically secure. 
Economic insecurity does not therefore directly lead to any sense of insecurity or security 
except in the case of a group of men who are likely to have been unemployed and who are 
most likely to be unsatisfied with their economic situation. On the basis of these results, we 
could not say that economic insecurity leads to a xenophobic reaction -there was no 
association with migrants and minorities. However it does lead to a fear of Russia in the 
minds of some men.
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